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regulation and ruin theory 
controlling the Probability of failure
Broadly speaking, this approach posits that the aim of 
prudential regulation is to ensure that the probability of 
ruin of insurance companies is below some given “accept-
able” value. The second assumption is that the main tool 
available to the regulator to reach this aim is to set a man-
datory solvency margin, namely the minimum amount of 
a firm’s own equity that may be used as a buffer. While 
this approach is traditional and classic in the insurance in-
dustry, it’s interesting to note that a similar view recently 
became influential in banking, with the rise of “Value-at-
Risk” methods to manage market and credit risks. These 
methods may involve very high-tech modeling tools, but 
they hinge on the same simple principles.
Let us illustrate this approach through the stylized 
example of an insurance company characterized by the 
following simplified balance sheet:
 Assets A Reserves R
  Equity E
At this stage, we neglect asset risk and thus assume that 
the assets of this company are composed of riskless invest-
ments, with a rate of return that we normalize to zero. We 
assume that the company doesn’t underwrite new risks. 
The profits and losses of the company are determined by 
the runoff, or the difference between the current estimates 
of future claims, namely the reserves R, and their eventual 
costs.
Defining (1 + x˜) as the random variable that character-
izes the ratio final cost/reserves, failure occurs at the end 
of the reference period when final cost R(1 + x˜) exceeds 
the value of assets:
R(1 + x˜) > A = R + E.
Subtracting R from both sides and then dividing by R, we 
see that failure is characterized by the stochastic event
x˜ > E/R.
Therefore, if the probability distribution of the ratio 
x˜, Φ, has been estimated by statistical methods, the prob-
ability of failure can be estimated as
Pr(x˜ > E/R) = 1 – Φ(E/R).
If m represents the 99 percent quantile of the probability 
distribution of x˜ (see Fig. 1), we see that imposing a mini-
mum margin requirement limits the probability of failure 
below 1 percent:
Equity     ≥ m ⇔ Pr(Failure) ≤ 1– Φ(m) = 1.
Premiums
Ruin theory essentially aims to solve more-sophisti-
cated, dynamic versions of this model in order to estimate 
the minimum solvency margin needed to obtain a survival 
probability of at least 99 percent (for example) over a given, 
possibly long, time horizon.
Let us now account for the riskiness of assets as follows. 
Consider a situation where the insurer has invested in two 
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types of assets: riskless assets, with a rate of return normalized 
to zero; and risky assets, with a random rate of return r˜. The bal-
ance sheet becomes
 Riskless assets A0 Reserves R
 Risky assets A1 Equity E
In this case, failure occurs when
A0 + A1(1 + r˜) < R(1 + x˜).
Since A0 + A1 = R + E, this is equivalent to
y˜ < –E,
where ˜y = A1 ˜r – Rx˜ denotes the net operating profit (the difference 
between financial income and runoff ). Assuming that y˜ can be 
approximated by a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 
σ2y, the probability of failure is approximated by N(–E/σy), where 
N is the distribution of a standard normal variable. Since the 1 
percent lower quantile of this distribution is approximately –2, 
the probability of failure will be less than 1 percent if E is at least 
equal to 2σy. Now σy can be computed easily:
σy =  √A21σ2r + R2σ2x ,
where σ2r denotes the variance of risky assets’ returns and σ2x denotes 
the variance of the loss ratio, and assuming that these two risks are 
independent. Therefore, the way to limit the probability of failure to 
a predetermined threshold is to impose a minimum capital require-
ment whose computation is reminiscent of the U.S. RBC:
Equity ≥ √4A21σ2r + 4R2σ2x .
The assumption underlying such ratios, that technical and finan-
cial risks are independent, seems to be a heroic one. Casual evidence 
suggests that distressed insurance companies tend to experience 
financial and operational difficulties simultaneously. Thus, assum-
ing that these risks are positively correlated seems more realistic. 
This correlation is, of course, related to the fact that both risks are 
driven by common factors, namely the organizational inefficiency 
of the company and the poor quality of its governance.
Practical limits of Ruin theory
Even if the actuarial approach provides theoretical foundations for 
margin requirements and RBC-type formulas, these formulas don’t 
seem particularly good at predicting failures or financial distress in 
practice. Several scholars (Cummins et al. 1995, 1999; Grace et al. 
1993) have studied the predictive power of the RBC and FAST scores 
for forecasting the failure or financial distress of U.S. insurance com-
panies. All of these studies have concluded that the predictive power 
of these techniques is very weak. (Note that this does not necessarily 
imply that these scores are “wrong.” It may simply be that statistical 
models of insurance failures are bound to be rejected because the 
sample of failed insurance companies is too small.) 
Other methods, based on cash-flow simulations, seem to 
work better. In any case, it’s fair to say that no simple method is 
available for predicting the financial distress of insurance com-
panies. It seems unrealistic to assume that supervisory agencies 
can implement a universal formula for limiting the probability of 
failures of insurance companies to an exogenous maximum.
Conceptual limits of Ruin theory
®  Ruin theory doesn’t explain why regulating the probability of 
ruin is desirable. Most corporate-finance textbooks start out with 
the well-known irrelevance result of Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
This result states that, without any friction on capital markets, the 
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debt-to-equity ratio of a firm should have no impact on its total 
value. Indeed, the capital structure affects only the way the total 
value of the firm is split between shareholders and debt holders.
If we apply the Modigliani-Miller theorem to insurance com-
panies, it’s not obvious why capping the probability of ruin should 
create any value. Asking the shareholders of an insurance com-
pany to pledge assets to cover the insurance liabilities in excess 
of collected premiums should be neutral in a frictionless world. 
Policyholders should, indeed, be willing to pay higher insurance 
premiums because this pledge reduces the insurer’s probability of 
default. But this benefit would be exactly offset by the cost of newly 
committed capital, at least if there is no arbitrage opportunity.
The assumption of perfect, frictionless capital markets that 
underlies this Modigliani-Miller irrelevance result isn’t satisfied 
in practice. Corporate-finance theory has put forward several rea-
sons why capital structure matters. But ruin theory is, in general, 
developed in stylized, ideal models where none of the imper-
fections that may justify the relevance of capital structure are 
present. In other words, ruin theory studies prudential regulation 
in models where prudential regulation is pointless!
®  Ruin theory doesn’t tell us why capital requirements are the best 
way to cap the probability of ruin. Even if one takes for granted 
that the probability of failure of insurance companies has to be 
regulated, it’s still not clear why the best control for this probability 
is the capital of insurance companies. To motivate this point, let’s 
slightly enrich the elementary model of ruin theory used in this 
article by modeling the insurance portfolio more explicitly.
Consider an insurer with equity E and a portfolio of N in-
dependent and identically distributed risks. Denote by S˜i the 
random variable representing the loss derived from risk i, dur-
ing the relevant time period, and for i = 1,…, N. We assume that 
each S˜i has a mean μ (normalized to 1) and a standard deviation 
σ. Each risk is covered by a premium 1 + ρ, where ρ > 0 represents 
the loading factor (net of reinsurance premiums).
The probability of ruin Pr is thus
Pr(E + N(1 +ρ) < S˜1 + S˜2 + . . . + S˜N)
= Pr(S1 + S˜2 + . . . + S˜N – N > E + Nρ).
By virtue of Chebyshev’s inequality, one has
                                Nσ2           1                          E + NρPr ≤ ————— = ——, where β  = —————.
                          (E + Nρ)2       β2                           √Nσ
Chebyshev’s inequality states that the probability that a zero-mean 
random variable Y˜ exceeds some threshold α is less than var(Y˜)/α2. 
Here we take Y˜ = S1 + S˜2 + . . . + S˜N – N and α = E + Nρ. Since indi-
vidual losses are independent, the variance of Y˜ equals Nσ2. 
Chebyshev’s inequality yields a very conservative upper bound 
for the probability of ruin, used here for illustrative purposes only. 
In ruin theory, β is usually referred to as the security coefficient. 
Increasing β amounts to reducing the probability of ruin. This 
expression shows that there are many ways to raise β. Increasing 
E by means of capital requirements is, of course, one of them, but 
there are other methods, like increasing N or ρ or reducing σ.
Thus, instead of imposing capital requirements, why not re-
quire insurance companies to load their premiums sufficiently, 
buy a sufficient amount of reinsurance to reduce σ, or even hold 
sufficiently large portfolios?
Any sensible practitioner or economist has an obvious answer 
to this. Modification of the underwriting policy, by raising either 
the tariffs or the size of the portfolio, has to be carried out very 
cautiously. Otherwise, for reasons of informational asymmetry in 
particular, the complex adverse effects of such strategies on the 
nature of underwritten risks may well overcome the benefits. 
Similarly, reinsurance reduces the volatility of losses σ, but 
also the expected profit ratio (net loading factor) ρ, because some 
fraction of the premiums is used to reward reinsurers’ risk taking. 
Whether these two effects result in an increase or a decrease of 
the probability of ruin depends on the design and pricing of the 
reinsurance treaty.
On the whole, it’s hard to believe that regulators would be able to 
use such alternative tools to control for the probability of ruin and to 
account properly for their adverse effects. The information-collec-
tion and technical skills required to achieve this are too important. 
But are things really different for capital requirements?
®  Ruin theory neglects the market’s response to regulation. Let 
us again assume that it’s desirable to limit the occurrence of ruin 
due to bad luck. Let us further assume that the only tool available 
to the regulator to achieve this aim is a capital requirement. Ruin 
theory still misses the point that such a tool has to be handled 
very carefully in order to deliver an appropriate outcome. This ap-
proach views insurance companies as “black boxes’” transforming 
premiums into random variables. 
But insurance companies are firms that respond optimally to 
their economic environment and business conditions. Imposing a 
capital requirement affects the cost of one of the crucial inputs of 
the insurance production function: capital. Therefore, any analysis 
of the impact of capital requirements should take into account the 
response of insurance companies to those new production costs.
The theoretical study of this response has been carried out in 
the banking sector by, among others, Kim and Santomero (1988) 
and Rochet (1992). These studies show that ill-designed capital 
requirements may lead to “regulatory arbitrage” by banks, namely 
activities aimed at reducing their regulatory capital requirement 
while actually increasing their risk of failure. This explains why 
the Basel Committee has expended a lot of effort reforming the 
Cooke ratio toward a more risk-based approach.
Regarding insurance, this suggests that the U.S. system of RBC, 
aimed at reflecting the riskiness of assets and insurance portfolios 
better than the European solvency margin, may deal better with 
regulatory arbitrage. However, it’s not clear how a one-size-fits-all 
regulation, implemented by a regulator that cannot possibly know 
as much about firms as the firms themselves, could really be risk 
based and hence not distort insurers’ strategies toward inefficient 
portfolios.  ●
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